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 To maintain the proper functioning of critical 
applications based on Wireless Sensor Networks, 
we must provide an acceptable level of security 
while taking into account limited capabilities of the 
sensors. In this paper we proposed a mobile 
approach to secure data exchanged by structured 
nodes in cluster. The approach is based on mobile 
nodes with significant calculation and energy 
resources that allow cryptographic key 
management and periodic rekeying. However, 
mobility in wireless sensor networks aims to 
increase the security and lifetime of the entire 
network. The technical methods used in this paper 
are based on cryptography elliptic curves and key 
management through a balanced binary tree. To 
compare the performance of the proposed 
approach with other mobile algorithms, we focused 
on the following metrics: the energy consumed by 
normal sensors and cluster heads, the number of 
packets exchanged during key installation, time to 
generate and distribute cryptographic keys, and 
the memory used by the different sensors to store 
keys. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed 
of a set of nodes sensors. Each of these nodes has 
the capacity to collect and transfer data to a base 
station connected to the user. 
Security plays a central role in critical 
applications of the Wireless sensor network [1] 
such as smart cities applications, public lighting 
management, military applications, security 
solutions, etc. During normal operation of the 
network, data can be threatened by external 
events- something that should not happen. 
Security insurance [2]-[3] is a serious challenge, 
especially when nodes are made up of electronic 
devices [4] with limited material capacities. 
Two key management approaches are available: 
symmetric and asymmetric approach [5]-[6]. The first 
focuses on the effectiveness of establishing 
cryptographic keys after network deployment. 
However, asymmetric cryptography offers better 
resistance against compromise nodes, but requires 
additional costs on the software and hardware nodes. 
Recently, experts in cryptography have made use of 
techniques based on elliptic curves [7] that can 
replace integer calculations by the calculations in 
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groups associated with elliptic curve, which turns 
the cryptography based on ECC stronger. 
Some approaches based on the elliptic curve 
cryptography [8]-[9] have been proposed by the 
scientific community, yet the limited capacity of 
captors considerably slow down the life span of 
the entire network and does not allow any 
complex calculations [10].  To maintain the 
proper functioning of critical applications, the 
key management and rekeying must be periodic 
after network deployment.  Each node must have 
all necessary keys to communicate with 
neighbors or with nodes in the same cluster. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
following: in section II, we presented 
applications security in Casablanca Smart City.  
Then, we explained how mobility may affect the 
safety and life of the WSN. In section III, we 
presented some algorithms used mobility in 
WSN. In section IV, we discussed the technical 
methods used in this paper, especially the 
cryptography based on ECC and the AVL tree 
[11]. Thereafter, we described the proposed 
approach and its added value by algorithms and 
explanations of each phase. In the last section, 
we analyzed the different algorithms and 
compared the performance of each approach 
[12]- [13] by looking at: the average energy 
consumed per node, the memory used by node 
for storing ECC keys, the number of packets 
exchanged when installing keys and ECC keys 
computing time and rekeying. 
 
2 Applications security in Casablanca 
smart city  
 
The Casablanca has launched the study to 
develop a master plan for digital processing and 
information systems. This study has several 
phases, including analysis, up growth of digital 
development plan, as well as the pane of 
intelligent applications. Then it launched 
concrete projects and started their achievements. 
Profits of applications based on the wireless 
sensor networks [14] may enhance the 
management of road traffic; inter-modality 
between different means of transport, through the 
traceability of cleaning operations, energy 
efficiency, etc. The objective is to put the 
applications for the benefit of the citizens [15]. 
However, attacks can have negative impacts on 
all applications in the city, thus minimizing security in 
those solutions. So, it is important to secure these 
applications in order to maintain their effectiveness. 
The applications will be used daily by the citizens of 
the city and will help to manage the city and save 
energy resources much better [16]. In order to secure 
these applications, we proposed nodes attached to the 
6 existing tramway lines shown in Fig. 3, to ensure 
coverage for the entire city (a diameter of 42 Km). 
Each line contains 8 tramways with a 10 minutes 
passage frequency. Hence, the rekeying frequency 
remains an organizational choice and depends on the 
risks to which the sensors are exposed. 
Mobile nodes collaborate with each other to ensure 
full coverage of the city and the rekeying of all 
applications. Each mobile node, by communicating 
with a cluster head, asks whether the rekeying period 
has expired. If the period has expired the mobile node 
starts rekeying, if not the mobile node moves to the 
next cluster. 
 
3 Algorithms using mobility in the WSN  
 
3.1 A mobile agent approach for sensor 
networks   
 
Cai, Chen, Hara, Shu and Kwon [17] proposed a 
multi-agent route planning algorithm based on the 
GA-MIP (genetic algorithm based multi-agent 
itinerary planning), to solve problems related to the 
latency of data collection and the overall imbalance of 
energy consumption in the energy network in wireless 
sensor networks. 
 
The proposed GA-MIP algorithm is based on the 
geographical distance and the size of the collected 
data that impact the energy consumption of the sensor 
nodes. With these two factors, GA-MIP provides a 
new approach to determining the number of mobile 
agents and the clustering of source nodes. Once the 
number of the mobile agents and the node groups are 
defined, GA-MIP identifies the itinerary to be visited 
by each mobile agent using the GRASP heuristic 
algorithm (Greedy randomized adaptive search 
procedure). The simulations carried out showed the 
performance and efficiency of GA-MIP to reduce the 
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3.2 A Kalman framework based mobile 
node localization in rough environment  
 
Given the importance of precise location of 
nodes in RCSFs, a mobile method has been 
proposed by Chu and Cheng-dong [18] for 
RCSFs in LOS / NLOS environments. The 
measurements used in the proposed method are 
time difference by arrival (TDOA) and received 
signal strength (RSS) [19]. 
 
Firstly, this approach adopts the general 
likelihood ratio method to identify the 
propagation condition in Kalman framework. 
According to the condition identified, the method 
VB-AKF (variation of Bayesian approximation 
adaptive Kalman filtering) is used to filter the 
NLOS error in the NLOS condition, and the 
classic Kalman update is used in the LOS 
condition. Thereafter, the maximum likelihood 
method is used to estimate the position of mobile 
node. Compared with Kalman filter and 𝐻𝐻∞ 
filter, the proposed method by simulation has the 
highest localization accuracy with varying 
parameters.   
 
4 Technical methods used in the 
proposed approach 
 
4.1 Key management based on the AVL 
tree 
 
After deployment, sensors need to establish 
cryptographic keys with their neighbors to 
communicate securely. However, static 
management is not appropriate after a long time. 
 
In this paper, we proposed a management of 
cryptographic keys ECC based on the tree AVL 
[20] (the name comes from the last name initials 
of those who created this structure: Adelson, 
Velskii and Landis). In Fig. 1, the cryptographic 
keys are represented by circles and the sensor 
nodes by squares. 
In the AVL tree, each sensor must have all the 
keys corresponding to the nodes of the AVL tree. 
In addition, the sensors do not know the keys 
they do not need. For the balancing factor, each 
node of the tree, the difference in height of its 




Figure 1. Keys and sensors in the AVL tree. 
 
h(TL) : the height of the subtree to the  left 
h(TR) : the height of the subtree to the  right 
 
|h(TL) − h(TR)| ≤ 1 (1) 
 
This obviously leads to the property that any sub-tree 
of a balanced binary tree under the AVL tree is 
balanced [20] in the AVL sense. 
 
The main question is to determine the maximum 
height of the balanced AVL binary tree. To find out, 
it is necessary to determine the minimum number 
(NBhmin) of nodes of a balanced binary tree AVL using 
(of) a height (h). 
 
NB0min=0, NB1min=1, NB2min=2 (2) 
NBhmin=1+ NBh-1min+NBh-2min   for h≥2    (3) 
 
This recurrence has as a solution Fibonacci number 
(F) to order h + 2 minus 1. So: 
 
NBhmin=Fh+2−1 (4) 
NBhmin =1/√5*(((1+√5)/2) h+2− ((1+√5)/2) 
h+2)) −1 (5) 
NBhmin ≈1/√5*(((1+√5)/2) h+2) −1 (6) 
 
So conversely, the maximum height h of an AVL tree 
containing n elements is such that: 
 
1/√5*(((1+√5)/2) h+2) −1   ≤ n (7) 
h≤ loga((n+1)* √5)−2   with   a=(1+√5)/2 (8) 
h≤ loga(2)* log2 (n+1)− loga(√5)−2 (9) 
h≤ 1,44* log2 (n+1)− 0,328 (10) 
 
The worst case of complexity of balanced binary trees 
under the AVL is log(n). 
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4.2 Cryptography based on the elliptic 
curves   
 
Cryptographic systems based on the elliptic 
curves allow to obtain a gain in efficiency in key 
management. In fact, such cryptosystems require 
a small size [22] of keys (for example, a 160-bit 
key when RSA use a 1024 bit key, with an 
equivalent level of security) this represents a 
significant advantage for wireless sensor 
networks [23] whose memory space is very 
limited. In addition, the algorithms of 
calculations related to elliptic curves are faster, 
and therefore have an important debit to generate 
and exchange the keys [24]. 
 
The elliptic curve (E) is an algebraic curve [16] 
that can be represented by the Weierstrass 
equation: 
 
E:  y2 + a1xy + a3y =x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6 (11) 
 
We suppose that the curve is defined in a field 
(K) and the parameters a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K. In 
order to obtain a smooth curve with no reversal 
point, it is necessary for the discriminant of the 
curve to be Δ # 0. The complete definition of Δ is 
represented in the formula (12). 
 
∆ = -d22d8 − 8d43 − 27d62 − 9d2d4d6 (12) 
 
Where:  d2 = a12 + 4a2  
          d4= 2a4 + a1a3 
          d6= a32+4a6 
          d8= a12a6 + 4a2a6 − a1a3a4 + a2a32 − a42 
 
The equation of the elliptic curve can be 
simplified if the curve is defined on a first field 
(Fp). The Weierstrass equation can be 
transformed into a simple equation as the 
following: 
 
E:  y2=x3+ax+b (13) 
 
Where:  a, b ∈ Fp. 
 
The discriminant of the curve: 
 
Δ = -16 (4a3 + 27b2)   and   Δ # 0 (14) 
       
Actually, this is the curve’s form used in this paper. 
 
5 The proposed method 
 
In this paper we propose architecture based on mobile 
nodes with significant capacities of calculations and 
no energetic constraints as they are fixed to movable 
empowered structures. The mobile nodes will be 
responsible for ensuring a good level of security by 
generating the ECC key [25], storing them in the AVL 
tree, and making periodic rekeying. The operations 
performed by the mobile nodes can minimize the cost 
of communication between the nodes and the base 
station which increases the lifetime of the entire 
network. Moreover, the results estimated how many 
messages we minimize during installation of the keys 
and how fast generating and storing of the ECC keys 
occur. In section 6, we also compared the result with 
the following implementations; specially RECC [12] 
and AVL-Headers/AVL-KDC [13]. The obtained 
results proved that the proposed algorithm can 
outperform other approaches based on the ECC.   
 
After deployment, the mobile nodes cooperate to 
secure all clusters that are on their ways. In order to 
maintain security of the entire network [26], it is 
necessary to establish a strategy for coordination 
between mobile nodes and estimate the time of 
intervals between rekeying passages. To evaluate the 
performance, the mobile approach is implemented as 




Figure 2. Coverage by two mobile nodes. 
 
The power of the mobile nodes enables them to have 
a significant coverage radius, and nodes located 
within that radius can exchange directly with the 
mobile node. However, nodes outside the cover (out 
of the radio coverage) may receive the messages from 
its CH, not directly from MN. 
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5.1 Assumptions and requirements   
 
This so-called approach is based on the following 
assumptions and requirements: 
• The mobile nodes are powerful as a 
workstation capable of sending the wide-
range radio signals. 
• Each MN has no constraints on energy, 
computing, and storage capacity.  
• Normal nodes have the same capacity in 
processing, energy, and storage. 
• The compromise of a node means that all 
information stored in its memory are known 
by the attacker. 
• Communication channels are bidirectional, 
i.e., if a node ‘x’ can receive such a message 
from another node ‘y,’ it is possible likewise. 
• An attacker can listen to all traffic; return old 
messages, or inject their own messages. 
 
5.2 The main phases of the mobile approach 
 
Three phases compose the proposed approach. 
During the deployment phase, all nodes are 
preloaded by the same network key (NK) which 
will later be the network broadcast key, as well 
as it the root of the AVL tree. After the clusters' 
formation in the setting phase, the mobile nodes 
calculate their distances with cluster heads and 
establish the membership list. Thereafter, each 
cluster head forms its member's list and sends it 
to the mobile node to which it is attached. Each 
mobile node generates and stores the ECC keys 
of its clusters in the AVL tree afterwards; it sends 
the ECC key for each node of the selected 
cluster. During the rekeying phase, each mobile 
node calculates its passage cycle based on the 
number of clusters and nodes per cluster. When 
an area is covered by several mobile nodes, the 
CH sends in the arrival of each MN the time 
elapsed since the last rekeying. If the time is 
longer than the rekeying time, the MN starts 
rekeying operations, if not the MN moves to the 
next cluster. 
- Deployment phase: 
We proposed that all nodes are randomly 
deployed and are preloaded with a network key 
NK to communicate with the CH and 
neighboring nodes. Then, each node broadcasts a 
“Hello” message with its ID to all neighbors 
within its listening range. The nodes in a node’s 
neighborhood respond by sending their own ID. Each 
node prepares a list of its neighbors N(ni) from 
distances di,j between them. The rest of this phase is 
described in the following algorithms: 
 
a- Initialization: 
ni  broadcasts “Hello” message with its ID; 
ni  messages from neighbors; 
         IF no message received THEN ni is ORPHAN; 
         ELSE ni receives messages with ID and: 
ni   :  collects IDs for received messages; 
         the neighbor set N(ni);  
ni computes dij, for all neighbors nj ϵ N(nj); 
ni   :  computes e(ni) for node to become CH; 
ni  (dij, N(ni), e(ni)) to all nj ϵ N(nj); 
         computes weight w(ni); 
ni  w(ni) to all nj ϵ N(nj); 
         collects Nw(ni) weights of distance 1 nodes; 
 
b- Cluster Formulation: 
      IF (e(ni) = 1) and (Nw(ni) ≠ 0) THEN  
           IF (w(ni) ≥ w(nj)) for all nj ϵ N(ni) THEN 
ni : initiates a cluster;  ELSE  
ni : joins a cluster formed by nj ϵ N(ni); 
      ELSE each node computes |N(nj)| for all nj ϵ 
N(ni); 
      IF |N(nj) | ≥ |N(ni) | for all nj ϵ N(ni) THEN 
ni  : initiates a cluster; ELSE 
ni  : joins cluster created by nj; 
ni  broadcasts invitation ; 
ni  the responses to form Si = {ni,ni1,ni2,…,niI};  
ni  Si to all neighbors; 
 
c- Cluster Reduction: 
IF (w(ni) = 0) and (fs*|Si| ≤ |N(ni)|) THEN 
Enquire: ni asks members of Si of their alternate 
cluster choices and receives responses; 
Reduce: If > (fr*|Si|) members have choice to 
join other cluster then send message to accept 
invitation; 
 
d- Cluster Head Selection: 
IF |Si|| N(nj)| THEN 
ni  : is confirmed as a CH; ELSE IF 
nij  : can be reduced THEN 
        create connectivity by reducing nij; 
         ELSE IF e(nij) = 1 and (Si − nij) ϵ N(nj) THEN 
nij  : is confirmed as CHi; 
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- Configuration phase: 
During the first pass, the mobile nodes establish 
the membership list from the calculated distances 
between them and the CH. After each MNi they 
select the nearest cluster head and ask it to send 
its list of members. Once received by the MN, 
then the cryptographic keys begin to generate 
depending on the number of node by cluster. 
When the key generating ends, the MNi stores 
the keys in the AVL sub-tree of the cluster. At 
this moment the MNi sends the tree branch that 
contains all ECC keys allowing each node to 
communicate with its neighbors and the CH. 
When sending of the key ends, the CH is 
responsible for sending the ECC keys required 
for nodes belonging to the cluster, which are 
outside the coverage of all MN, hereinafter, the 
algorithm of this phase.   
 
a- Collecting Information: 
MN  message “Hello” to CHi with its ID; 
MN  messages from CHi; 
IF no message received THEN MN falls 
asleep for tw and sends the message 
"Hello"; 
ELSE MN receives messages with ID and 
an estimate of the distance based on the 
received signal power. 
MN : collects (ID, dCHi,MN) for received 
messages; 
         the CHi set N(CHi);  
 
b- Generating ECC Keys: 
MN : computes for each cluster all public and 
private keys requiredfor all nodes, 
following this algorithm:  
          k0=1 and k ← (kn-1,…,k1,k0)2 
         Set P1 ← P, P2=2P 
         For i from i-2 down to 0 do 
         If ki=1 then 
         Set P1 ← P1 + P2, P2 ← 2P2. 
         Else 
         Set P2 ← P2 + P1, P1 ← 2P1. 
         end for 
         RETURN ( Q = P1) 
 
c- Insert the keys in the AVL tree: 
MN : inserts the keys generated in the AVL 
tree, T denotes the tree  
         pointer and x denotes ECC keys: 
         If T=null THEN 
         T:=new tree; T.data:= x; height:=0; 
         case 
         T.data = x : return ; 
         T.data > x : return Insert(T.left, x) 
         if ((height (T.left) – height (T.right)) = 2) { 
         if (T.left.data > x ) THEN  
         T = RotateFromLeft (T);  
         else    T = DoubleRotateFromLeft (T);} 
         T.data < x : return Insert (T.right, x) 
         Similar to the left case 
        Endcase 
 
d- Send the necessary keys: 
MN: computes the neighbors of each node based on 
its position in the AVL tree.  
MN  all keys to communicate with them in the 
selected cluster. 
 
- Rekeying phase: 
The need for security is different from one application 
to another and the risks to which the nodes are 
exposed should be studied in advance. When an 
application requests a high level of security, it is 
recommended to enforce the periodic rekeying T (for 
example every hour), in order to limit the impact of 
key compromise on data flows. One of the advantages 
of the proposed approach is that a mobile node 
renews the cryptographic keys of all clusters during 
each pass Ti, greatly increasing the security of the 
entire network. During the ∆Ti interval, the mobile 
node compares the nodes list during the last pass and 
the list sent by the CH to check if a node has left or 
has just arrived in the cluster. Hereinafter, a 
chronology of the rekeying cycles ∆Ti for each cluster 




Figure 3. Example of rekeying by a mobile node. 
 





6.1 Methods based on the elliptic curves   
 
A- Routing Driven Key Management (RECC)  
The RECC method [12] is based on routing 
protocol for heterogeneous sensor networks. The 
main idea is that a node can communicate only 
with a few neighbors. Before installing the keys, 
the protocol calculates the itinerary tree using a 
service to evaluate the location of each node, 
which requires several exchanges of messages 
between the nodes. All these communications are 
not protected, allowing an attacker to capture and 
edit these messages. However, the routing 
protocol does not have the ability to add a new 
node or to update keys.  
 
B- AVL-Headers and AVL-KDC 
Network contains a large number of nodes that 
form clusters around the node elected Cluster-
Head (CH). They receive and then transmit nodes 
messages to the base station. The ECC keys 
generation and storage in the AVL tree are done 
by the base station while distribution is done 
either by a KDC server or by CH [13]. 
In AVL-KDC approach, when a node arrives or 
leaves the network, the KDC server starts 
updating public keys located throughout the node 
path to the base of the AVL tree and reconfigures 
the AVL tree. Then, it sends an update message to 
all Headers. Thereafter, each Header broadcasts 
the message to all nodes in the cluster. 
In AVL-Headers, CH starts updating the ECC 
cryptographic keys on the branch of the node that 
has just arrived or left the AVL tree; it 
reconfigures and rebalances the AVL tree. 
Finally, it broadcasts the updates to all nodes in 
the cluster that depletes its energy resources. 
 
6.2 Simulation parameters and metrics   
 
The different algorithms are implemented with 
the software TOSSIM (TinyOS Simulator) and 
we use IEEE 802.15.4 as a communication model 
for the network. 
In this part of the paper, we evaluated the 
performance of the proposed mobile algorithm 
for distribution and periodic MADR rekeying by 
comparing simulation with both methods RECC 
and AVL-KDC / AVL-Headers, hereinafter, the 
simulation parameters for a normal node. 
 









Initial Energy of a 
normal sensor 10J 
Active mode 0,073J/s 
Sleep mode 0,005J/s 
Data traffic CBR 
 
In this section we presented the results that 
correspond exactly to the values obtained by 
simulations of the studied methods. In order to 
evaluate each method performance, we will focus on 
the following four metrics:  
 Energy consumption per node/cluster head  
 ECC Keys computing time and rekeying 
 Number of stored keys 
 Number of exchanged messages 
 
6.3 Comparison of metrics   
 
A- Comparison of Energy consumption by sensor 
 
The lifetime of a network depends heavily on the 
energy consumed by the sensors that compose it. 
Several studies showed that a large part of energy 
consumed in the WSN is due to wireless 
communications and the calculations performed by 
the processing units. 
In the following simulation we focused on the 
operations performed by the mobile nodes that have 
no energetic constraint to ensure proper security and 
increase the lifetime of the entire network. The 
following graph shows the energy consumed by each 
method during the distribution of the ECC keys. 
The results show that the RECC method consumes 
more energy because of the large number of packets 
exchanged during distribution and the ECC key 
installation. By against, the power consumed by 
normal nodes in both approaches AVL-KDC and 
AVL-Headers do not depend with the size of the 
network.  
We can see after this comparison that the mobile 
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nodes and their permanent energy can drastically 
save energy consumed and that this is the strong 




Figure 4. The energy consumption per node. 
 
B- The ECC Keys computing time and rekeying 
More time do regeneration and distribution of 
cryptographic keys take, more vulnerable the 
network becomes. When the number of cluster 
per node is large, the generation will take more 
time because of the complex calculations in order 
to generate the ECC keys. After deployment of 
the RECC approach, the nodes evaluate their 
positions in the network and calculate the routing 
table. All these operations require several 
message exchanges and more time before 
installing the keys. 
A header from the AVL-Headers takes at least 15 
minutes to calculate and manage ECC keys 
because of its limited computing capabilities, 
which puts the entire network at risk. In the 
MADR approach, the diffusion and rekeying of 
cryptographic keys are ensured by the mobiles 
nodes. The significant power calculation allows 
the mobile node to manage keys in a cluster of 
400 nodes in 752 seconds and rekey the same 
cluster every 380 minutes. At the end of each 
pass Ti, each sensor node must have new 
pairwise keys shared with the members of the 
neighbors’ list N(ni). 
It should be noted that when the rekeying period 
is short, the risk of compromising is also weak. 
We notice in Fig. 5 that the energy consumed in 
the rekeying phase depends on the duration of 
the rekeying period. However, for the rekeying 
period higher than 500min, the performance of 
the sensors becomes linear. We can consider this 






Figure 5. Variation of energy consumption in function 
of the rekeying period. 
 
C-  Number of Stored Keys 
 
The memory used by the nodes and cluster heads to 
store the cryptographic keys has an important role in 
the proper functioning of the network. When the used 
size is large, it requires more treatment and more 
energy is consumed. According to the size of the 
network, Fig. 6 shows memory used by the normal 




Figure 6. The size of memory used to store the keys by 
normal node. 
 
The cluster head is preloaded with all of its cluster 
keys (use almost 24000 bytes); which makes the 
RECC approach the most gourmand in terms of 
memory. The AVL-Headers use memory space that 
varies between 1200 and 2500 bytes. AVL-KDC and 
MN use a very limited memory space, because the CH 
is not loaded with the keys of the nodes in the cluster. 
The server KDC and the MN are responsible for the 
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AVL tree, which offers to the Cluster Head an 
economy of storage memory.  
The Fig. 6 shows a management method based 
on the AVL tree. The number of keys stored in 
the normal node depends only on the height of 
the AVL tree. Each node has the keys placed in a 
way to communicate with its neighbors and its 
Cluster Head. However, the number of keys 
stored in a normal node in the RECC approach 
depends on the size of the network, because each 
node has all the network keys. 
 
D- The Number of exchanged packets 
 
The last metric to discuss in this paper is the 
number of packets exchanged during distribution 
and Installation of the ECC keys. A large number 
of packets exchanged implies more energy 





Figure 7. Number of exchanged packets. 
 
In Fig. 7 we compared the number of exchanged 
packets by the nodes during distribution and 
rekeying. The RECC approach has no renewal 
mechanism of cryptographic keys which explain 
its small number in comparison to other methods. 
However, the rekeying in the AVL-KDC and 
AVL-Headers methods is performed after the 
outbreak of an external event. The MADR 
approach offers a periodic rekeying for all 
clusters. For a cycle of 5,400 seconds, the 
number of exchanged messages during 
distribution and rekeying is smaller than the 





6.4 The security analysis 
 
Time to generate and send cryptographic keys for 
both methods AVL-Headers and AVL-KDC is very 
long. Thus, the energy cost of exchanges and 
calculation has a great impact on the lifetime of the 
entire network. 
A normal node in the RECC approach communicates 
with all the nodes to be located in the network, after it 
calculated its routing table. All these operations take a 
long time before the generation and distribution of the 
cryptographic keys, which makes applications based 
on the WSN vulnerable to attacks. 
We found that the MADR approach has three strong 
points. The first deals with the lifetime of the 
network, mobile nodes that have no energy 
constraints ensuring all complex calculations [27] 
which can deplete the energy of a normal sensor. The 
second is security; the rekeying is done periodically 
which significantly reduces the risk of attacks [28]. 
The last point is regarding the network coverage. The 
significant power of the mobile nodes allows a large 
radius of coverage and even the nodes that are outside 
the coverage of mobile nodes to be managed by their 
Clusters heads. 
 
7 The conclusion and perspectives  
 
To maintain the effectiveness of critical applications 
based on the wireless sensor networks, we must 
ensure a good level of nodes security taking into 
account their limited energy and computing. 
In this paper, we proposed an approach based on 
mobile nodes for the ECC keys generation, 
distribution, and periodic rekeying of all clusters. The 
generation is done by the mobile node which stores 
subsequently the generated ECC keys in the AVL tree 
before sending the keys to each node, It needs to 
communicate with its neighbors and its cluster head. 
The collaboration between powerful mobile nodes 
provides better coverage and a good key management. 
Due to the significant capabilities of the mobile nodes 
we can use them to secure critical applications, at the 
same time if needed in the applications which require 
difficult operations. 
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Nomenclature 
- AVL denotes a binary tree (authors names are: 
Adelson, Velskij and Landis). 
- CHi denotes a cluster head. 
- dij denotes distance measure from node ni to nj. 
- dCHi,MN denotes distance between the CH and MN. 
- ECC denotes the cryptography based on Elliptic 
Curves. 
- e(ni) denotes the readiness of node ni to become a 
CH. 
- fs small fraction. 
- fr fraction of reduction. 
- ID denotes a node identifier.  
- k  random number of the order of n (1 to n-1)  
- KDC denotes a keys distribution center. 
- MADR Mobile Algorithm for Key Distribution and 
Periodic Rekeying. 
- MN denotes the mobile node. 
- ni or nj denotes a node. 
- N(CHi) denotes the CH list. 
- N(ni) denotes the neighbors of node ni. 
- Nw(ni) is weight of neighbors. 
-  ORPHAN denotes that the node has no neighbor. 
- P denotes a point of the elliptic curve E. 
- Si is cluster with I + 1 member nodes.   
- tw denotes waiting time. 
- w(ni) denotes weight of nodes. 
- WSN denotes a wireless sensor networks. 
-  send a message. 
-  receive a message. 
 
